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The Impact of Price Disclosure on Dynamic Shopping Decisions 
 
 
Abstract 
A potentially powerful way to assist consumers in making dynamic shopping decisions is to 
disclose price information to them before they shop, for example by posting prices on the 
Internet. This paper addresses the differential impact of disclosing either only current, or both 
current and future prices, on consumer shopping decisions in multi-period tasks involving 
multiple product purchases. In the context of an Internet-based experiment, we find that 
consumer expenditure deviates more strongly from that of a normative model when both current 
and future prices are disclosed than if only current prices are disclosed. We investigate the 
behavioral effects underlying this finding by estimating a model that allows for variations in 
consumer discounting, strength of store price format preferences, as well as choice consistency 
between different price disclosure conditions.  
 
 
Key words: Consumer behavior, Dynamic choice models, Consumer decision-making, Price 
disclosure
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Increasingly, online technology such as the Internet enables consumers to obtain price 
information before they incur the costs of traveling to a store. Traditionally, retailers provided 
some price information to consumers in their homes, for instance through newspaper 
advertisements and TV commercials. Online retailers, however, typically present in a systematic 
and logical manner all current prices directly to consumers in their homes. In some instances, 
advanced information technology is even used to provide information to consumers on future 
prices. For example, both online and traditional retailers now use direct personalized e-mails to 
pre-announce specials to valued loyal customers.    
Although previous research suggests that lowering the search costs for price information 
increases consumer welfare (e.g., Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000) and that more transparent deal 
patterns allow consumers to reduce shopping expenditure over time (Krishna, 1994a), little is 
known about how consumers actually incorporate such information in their shopping decisions 
and if different levels of price disclosure affect consumers’ decisions differently.  
In this study we address these latter two questions by investigating how the disclosure of 
current prices, and current and future prices, affects consumers’ dynamic shopping decisions 
relative to a normative model. Drawing on previous research on the effects of task complexity on 
consumer decision-making (e.g., Bettman et al., 1993; Swait and Adamowicz 2001a, b) and the 
behavioral theory of dynamic consumer decisions (e.g., Meyer and Assunçao, 1990; Hutchinson 
and Meyer, 1994) we hypothesize how consumer performance relative to a normative model 
changes depending on the level of price disclosure. We investigate how three behavioral 
effects—variations in consumer discounting, strength of store price format preference, and 
choice consistency—explain observed differences in relative performance. We do this by first 
extending a normative model of consumers’ dynamic shopping decisions to incorporate these 
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behavioral effects. We then estimate this model on data from an Internet-based experiment in 
which consumers make store choice and purchase quantity decisions over time and are rewarded 
on the basis of minimizing their overall shopping expenditure.  
1.  The effect of price disclosure on dynamic shopping decisions 
Normatively speaking, increasing information on current and future prices should enable 
consumers to achieve lower expenditure. Specifically, information on future discounts should 
enable consumers to plan ahead more effectively and thus choose stores and purchase quantities 
in such a way that they benefit from a greater number of future discounts. Indeed, empirical 
research supports the general conclusion that more detailed information improves dynamic 
decision-making (e.g., Erdem and Keane, 1996; Krishna 1994a, b). Behaviorally oriented 
empirical research, however, also shows that consumers’ choices deviate systematically from 
those predicted by normative models of dynamic choice, and that consumers are unlikely to 
employ dynamic optimization rules to their full extent (see Meyer and Assunçao, 1990).  
We combine these two views to examine if different levels of price disclosure affect 
consumers’ decisions differently. In particular, we hypothesize that although increasing levels of 
price disclosure improves consumers’ dynamic shopping performance (by lowering overall 
expenditure), this also makes it harder for consumers to effectively ‘live up to’ a normative 
decision-making model.  
Increasing information about current and future prices increases task complexity for 
consumers because it requires them to take into account a greater number of decision factors so 
as to fully benefit from this information (c.f., Bettman, Johnson and Payne, 1990). We 
investigate three behavioral effects that potentially explain the differential impact on consumers’ 
decision performance based on these changes in task complexity. The first effect is consumers’ 
limited ability to be forward-looking in their dynamic decision-making. There is considerable 
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evidence that in making dynamic decisions, consumers are less forward-looking than normative 
models prescribe (e.g., Meyer and Assunçao, 1990). In contexts in which no (or very little) 
information on current and future events is available, normative economic theory shows that 
there is little to gain from forward planning (c.f., DeGroot, 1970). Thus, in such cases, 
consumers’ dynamic decision-making requires little forward-looking. When more information is 
available, however, consumers’ relative inability to incorporate future discounts into their 
decision-making affects their performance more strongly, leaving their performance more greatly 
impaired relative to a normative model that fully incorporates this information. Therefore we 
expect that as more information about current and future prices becomes available, consumers’ 
limited ability to be forward-looking will affect their performance more strongly relative to a 
normative model.  
Second, from research in static contexts, we know that consumers respond to increased 
task complexity by adopting simplifying strategies in making decisions (c.f., Bettman et al., 
1993). In the context of our study, we expect that one such simplifying strategy is likely to be 
consumers’ use of store price format as a decision variable, specifically whether the store in 
question follows an EDLP or Hi-Lo price format. This heuristic is consistent with recent research 
that shows that a major feature of consumers’ simplifying strategies when faced with task 
complexity is a stronger focus on alternative specific constants (e.g., brands) (Swait and 
Adamowicz 2001a). Normatively, when purchasing a fixed product basket, consumers should 
base their shopping decisions exclusively on their expected expenditure of buying in different 
stores. We expect, however, that in order to simplify their choices, consumers will develop store 
price format preferences over and above their rational expectations for spending in each store.  
 4
A third (and related) behavioral effect of task complexity we expect is that consumer 
choices become less consistent as levels of price disclosure increase. Research in static decision-
making shows that the reliability with which consumers’ utilities relate to the choices they make 
(i.e., consumers’ choice consistency) becomes smaller across different choice sets as the 
composition of these choice sets becomes more complex (e.g., Dellaert, Brazell and Louviere, 
1999; Swait and Adamowicz, 2001b). We expect that a similar effect occurs when consumers are 
faced with more complex dynamic decision tasks such as those we study.  
2. Formal model 
We first develop a normative model as a base and then add to it the three behavioral 
effects discussed above. The assumptions of the normative model are similar to those in previous 
research (e.g., Krishna, 1994a) and are based on realistic marketing scenarios (see Appendix 1). 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that our model is in some ways, unavoidably, a simplification of 
reality; for instance, we do not allow for flexible consumption (e.g., Bell, Chiang and 
Padmanabhan, 1999). In our experiment, however, we control for such simplifications in our 
model’s features by constructing subjects’ task accordingly (see section 3.1 below and Appendix 
1 for details). 
In each shopping period, the consumer faces the optimization problem of choosing where 
to shop and how much to buy to meet his or her (current and future) consumption goals so that 
total shopping expenditure over time is minimized. Let N be the set of all products n, I the set of 
consumers i, and S the set of stores s. On each trip consumers choose one store to purchase their 
groceries, where st ∈ S is the store chosen by the consumer in week t. Let qntα be the quantity 
purchased of product n in week t at α, a price index as defined below. Now, the consumer faces 
the problem of minimizing his or her shopping expenditure in a time horizon of T weeks 
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(t=1,...,T), where T is the time horizon in the experiment. The total cost of a shopping trip is 
determined by the costs of the products purchased on that trip plus the monetary equivalent of 
the preference for visiting a store. If consumption goals are known and perfect product 
substitutability across stores is assumed, product utility does not enter the optimization task.  
Thus, each consumer i faces the multi-period optimization problem of minimizing the expected 
cost for each period t subject to constraints based on his or her weekly consumption needs and 
stocking restrictions. Let α be the index of possible prices, with respective probabilities 
)( αtnspPr  where α is an element of Ψnst - the set of indexes for possible prices for product n in 
store s at time t. For notational simplicity we do not include a subscript to indicate the fact that 
all parameters are estimated specifically for a given level price of disclosure. Then, consumer i’s 
expected costs for a purchase quantity qntα  of product n at store s in period t given price αtnsp  is 
defined as follows:  
(1)         pqppqE
nst
ttt nsntnsnsnti ∑Ψ∈= α ααααα )Pr()(   
Let Qt  be the feasible set of purchases which satisfy the relevant conditions. The effect of 
discounting future events is introduced by including a discount factor γ  that captures the fact that 
future expected costs may be discounted with a discount coefficient e(z-t)γ (exponential 
discounting).  We can now write out the consumer’s dynamic cost minimization problem in 
terms of the following two interrelated decisions that are repeated in all periods t. Though the 
consumer minimizes expenditure jointly over these two decisions, they are separated, because if 
consumers do not know the price in each store before they go there, they need to reconsider their 
purchase quantity decision once they are in the store and know its current prices. If consumers do 
have all stores’ current prices before they shop, then the two decisions are combined into one. 
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1. ‘Store and expected purchase quantity choice’.  To make a store choice at time z, the 
consumer minimizes the following function by choosing a store for the current period, while 
anticipating their potential store choices in remaining periods (t=z,..,T) as well as the quantities 
for these periods:  
(2) 
nsttnt
T
zt Nn
nsnti
tz QqpqEe
t
Ψ∈∈∑ ∑
= ∈
− ααααγ ,)()(  
2. ‘Purchase quantity choice’. After making the store choice, the consumer enters the store and 
has the opportunity to observe the actual prices αznsp  in the store.  Therefore, the consumer then 
minimizes the following ‘updated’ function by choosing qnzα, qntα and st, (t=z+1,...,T):  
(3) 
nsttntNn
T
zt
nsnt
Nn
i
tz
nsnz   QqpqEepq tz Ψ∈∈+∑ ∑ ∑∈ += ∈− ααααγαα ,)(1 )(  
The above two steps describe the consumer’s optimization for any week. The 
optimization problem over all periods is then solved by backward induction (Bellman, 1957). 
The solution to this optimization is outlined in the technical appendix to the paper. 
Now, we extend this base-model to account for variations in discounting that express 
differences in the degree to which consumers are forward-looking. To do so, we include an 
additional discount factor δ that captures the fact that future expected costs may be discounted 
with a discount coefficient that differs from the normative rate γ. If consumers are less forward-
looking than the normative model, then δ will be significant.  
We also capture consumers’ baseline preferences β for visiting stores st with different 
price formats. Specifically, we introduce a variable 
ts
R which may differ, for example, between 
stores with EDLP or Hi-Lo price formats. We allow consumer preferences for store price formats 
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to differ across levels of price disclosure as a means of capturing consumers’ reliance on store 
price formats as a driver of their shopping decisions.  
We also introduce error in the model to allow for deviations between observed consumer 
decisions and the proposed model and to be able to estimate the statistical significance of the 
behavioral effects. To this end, we assume that within each price disclosure condition, errors are 
independently and identically Gumbel distributed, but that between price disclosure conditions 
error variance may differ. Such error differences may be due to, for example, differences in the 
difficulty of making choices between the price disclosure conditions. Finally, as we mention 
above, the consistency with which consumers make their decisions varies depending on choice 
complexity (e.g., Swait and Adamowicz, 2001b). To capture this effect, we introduce a scale 
parameter λ  that is inversely related to the error component in the model (e.g., Allenby and 
Ginter, 1995).1 Dividing the store price format preference by the scale parameter also allows us 
to express the entire model in monetary terms. 
Let )(1 zsC be the expected costs in decision stage 1 of choosing store sz in week z, and 
)(2 zq2C be the expected costs in decision stage 2 of choosing purchase quantity basket zq2  in 
week z. Let z1ε and z2ε  be the error terms in observing these costs respectively. Then, the 
econometric model for decision stages 1 and 2 can be expressed as follows: 
1. ‘Store and expected purchase quantity choice’   
(4) ∑ ∑
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2. ‘Purchase quantity choice’  
                                                 
1 Note that improving estimation efficiency by assuming one error scale across all price disclosure conditions was 
not feasible for two reasons. First, it is not possible to disentangle the combined effect of error scale and structural 
parameters within each price disclosure condition. Second, none of the other parameters can be used as a basis for 
scaling the estimates across conditions.  
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Thus, we can model both the store choice and the purchase quantity decision within each 
level of price disclosure and for each period t using the multinomial logit model.  The probability 
that individual i chooses st  in period t is: 
(6) 
∑
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If we denote the set of all possible purchase baskets in decision stage 2 of period t as tQ2 , the 
probability of choosing the basket of purchases tq2  by individual i is: 
(7) 
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We estimate this model by maximizing the log-likelihood function for the joint choice of 
store and purchase quantity.  If we define: 
(8) 
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then the likelihood function is expressed as: 
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3. Shopping expenditure game 
We developed an Internet-based shopping game as the context within which to 
investigate the effect of different levels of price disclosure on consumers’ dynamic shopping 
decisions. We designed the game to achieve maximum possible realism while still ensuring a 
rigorous context within which to manipulate the independent variables of interest to our study. 
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The shopping game was developed in an Internet-context using HTML and subjects played it for 
multiple periods (weeks).  
3.1 Description of the Internet-based shopping game 
The game was designed to have the following features. The main web page welcomed 
subjects to the game and gave them instructions on the rules and objectives of the game as well 
as the decisions they were required to make. The page informed subjects that they were required 
to play the role of consumers who needed to buy three food items—bread, cookies and milk—
every week over a period of thirty weeks. Subjects’ consumption goals were identical for all 
versions of the game and required them to consume one item of each product per week. The 
same page also informed subjects that their objective in the game was to minimize their expenses 
over the thirty week period by intelligently choosing the stores where they shopped and how 
much stock they kept at home. Subjects were told they would receive 10 Euros if they were 
among the top 10% of performers in (their version of) the game in terms of overall spending. 
This reward structure ensured that normatively subjects would aim to minimize total spending in 
the game and would not discount spending in later periods of the game. 
Next, subjects were instructed that every week they could choose to shop at only one of 
two possible stores. Subjects were told they could change stores from week to week but that, 
because of traveling time and costs, it was not possible to visit both stores in the same week. 
Additionally, the game was programmed to ensure that in each week subjects could visit only 
one store. Second, they were told that the traveling costs and time were identical for both stores 
so that search costs did not influence store choice. Store design was also identical for both stores 
and we indicated that all stores carried perfect substitutes for all products. Third, subjects were 
informed about each store’s price format and that this format remained the same throughout the 
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game. Fourth, subjects were told that milk could not be stored; this forced them to visit a store 
every period of the game. Bread and cookies could be stored for a maximum of one week to 
ensure that being forward-looking was necessary but relatively simple. If in any week subjects 
attempted to overstock they received a message that their stock would spoil. The game would 
then force them to re-enter the quantity they wished to purchase. Fifth, to simplify subjects’ 
minimization task they were given sufficient budgets to allow for maximum stocking in each 
period if they so wished.  
Once subjects had read the instructions on the main web page, they clicked to proceed 
with the shopping game. The game itself consisted of three sequential web pages. The first page 
was the subject's “Home” page. This page provided the subject's current budget, the (fixed) 
current week's consumption needs and the subject's current stock. When subjects had read the 
information on this page, they clicked to move to the next page that was the “Shopping Mall” 
page. This page provided information on the two stores from which subjects could choose to 
shop. Of these stores, one always followed a Hi-Lo price format, namely it featured occasional 
deep discounts and a regular price otherwise. The other store always followed an EDLP price 
format, meaning it always featured a fixed low price. The level of information on current and 
future prices in the two stores was varied on this page to achieve the desired manipulations for 
our different experimental conditions as described below.  
After reading this page, subjects clicked on the store which they wished to shop in and 
moved to the third and final page which was the “Store” page (each store was programmed to 
have its own “Store” page). On this page, subjects were provided with information on the prices 
of the three items in the store for that week. (Depending on the manipulations, further 
information on prices in the store for the next week could also be provided on this page.) When 
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subjects had read the information provided on this page, they selected the quantity of each 
product they wished to purchase from the store for that week. After making their purchase, the 
program returned subjects to their “Home” page. The “Home” page now reported subjects’ stock 
automatically updated to include their most recent purchases and the following week's 
consumption needs. In this manner, the shopping cycle repeated until the end of thirty weeks 
when the game automatically terminated with a page thanking subjects for their participation. 
3.2 Experimental design 
We employed a 3 (price disclosure level) X 2 (store price patterns) X 30 (weeks) full 
factorial design. The first two factors—price disclosure level and store price patterns—were 
between-subjects manipulations, while the third factor—weeks—was a within-subjects 
manipulation.  
We explicitly manipulated the price information provided to subjects. The three levels of 
price information were: information on stores’ general price format only (no price disclosure), 
information on general price format and the current week’s prices (current price disclosure), and 
information on general price format, current and following week’s prices as well (future price 
disclosure). In addition to the price disclosure level manipulation, we also varied the specific 
store price patterns in the two stores that subjects could choose from. Note that we distinguish 
between a store’s price format and its actual price pattern. Researchers typically distinguish 
between two archetypical retail price formats: 1) stores where prices are known to the consumer 
and are stable (i.e., EDLP stores) and 2) stores where prices are unknown and may or may not be 
discounted (i.e., Hi-Lo stores) (e.g., Bell and Lattin, 1998).  The two stores in our experiment 
each followed one of these two store price formats.  
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To prevent confounding of store price format preferences with actual price patterns, we 
developed two separate store price pattern conditions: one in which the Hi-Lo and another in 
which the EDLP store was preferred by the normative model. Each store price pattern was 
developed for all three price disclosure conditions. The actual price process for each price pattern 
was such that prices were drawn with equal probability from an equidistant set of possible prices. 
The expected value of these draws differed between the two store price pattern conditions. There 
was no correlation between prices in subsequent periods. We pool data from the two price 
pattern conditions in our model estimation. 
3.3 Procedure 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the 6 between-subjects experimental 
conditions. In all conditions, subjects played a trial version of the game before starting the actual 
experiment. This was done to ensure that subjects were familiar with how the game itself was 
played before they participated in the actual experiment. Subjects were required to play at least 
10 rounds of the trial game, but could play up to 30 rounds if they wished. The trial game was 
identical in structure to the actual game. However, the prices used in the trial game were 
different from those used in the real game and subjects were informed of this in advance.  
In the no price disclosure conditions, subjects did not receive information on either 
current or future prices before entering a store. However, subjects were informed about each 
store's general price format. Further, a key feature of the optimal model is that subjects have 
stable, known beliefs about the distributions of prices they face. To ensure this, we provided 
subjects with the following information. With respect to the Hi-Lo store, subjects were informed 
about the price range in the store as well as the probability of price promotion. With respect to 
the EDLP store, for which prices remained fixed throughout the experiment, subjects were told 
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the store’s prices at the start of the experiment. This feature was repeated in the current price 
disclosure and future price disclosure conditions. 
In the current price disclosure conditions, in addition to the information provided in the 
no price disclosure conditions, subjects were also given information every week on the current 
prices in the store before entering a store. The future price disclosure conditions differed from 
the other two conditions in that subjects were provided information on both the current and 
following week’s prices for the stores. Given that consumers could stock only one period in 
advance, they would highly benefit from knowing a product’s price one period ahead of time, but 
would benefit relatively less from knowing a product’s price two or more periods in advance.  
3.4 Subjects 
Subjects were members of a long-standing panel of Dutch consumers set-up and managed 
for research purposes by Tilburg University in the Netherlands. The panel consists of 
approximately 2000 individuals in 1500 households, and is largely representative of the 
population in terms of general characteristics such as age, sex, income, education and 
geographical location. Panel members respond voluntarily to consumer surveys that are run on a 
weekly basis and use a modem to gain access to the surveys. All members of the panel have 
access to home computers. Because the panel is not selected on the basis of PC ownership, 
subjects that do not have their own PC receive a basic configuration from the organization that 
runs the panel. In all there were 6 versions of the game corresponding to the 6 experimental 
conditions: 3 levels of price disclosure (games 1, 2 and 3) and 2 store price patterns (versions a 
and b within each game). Subjects were screened on the basis of having a minimum of Internet 
experience to be able to participate in the study. Half of this group (a randomly drawn subset of 
421 subjects) were contacted for participation in the study, of which 258 participated in the game 
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and 187 completed the game successfully. The main reason for not completing the game was a 
break-down in the subject’s connection to the Internet. The number of subjects in each version of 
the game was 27, 34, 31, 32, 36 and 27 for games 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, 3a and 3b respectively. All 
participants used the Internet to access the game and responded within four days after receiving 
the invitation to participate, which is the customary response period for the panel. 
4. Results 
We first analyzed subjects’ overall spending in the different price disclosure conditions. 
Table 1 presents the results. As expected, subjects’ absolute expenditure decreased as 
information levels increased. One-tail t-tests of the difference between subjects’ spending in the 
different information conditions revealed that spending was significantly lower in higher price 
disclosure conditions. Specifically, spending decreased from 266.6 to 243.6 to 237.2 for games 
1a, 2a and 3a (all differences significant at p<0.05) and from 266.1 to 241.0 to 236.4 for games 
1b, 2b and 3b (all differences significant at p<0.05). The improvement was greatest in moving 
from the no price disclosure to the current price disclosure condition (23 and 25.1 for the a and 
b games respectively). 
We then compared the improvement in spending of subjects’ actual choices as 
information increased with the corresponding improvement in spending of the normative model. 
These differences showed that initially, as price disclosure increased, subjects were able to reap 
the benefits of using the additional price information. Specifically, in going from the no price 
disclosure to the current price disclosure condition, the average reduction in subjects’ actual 
spending was almost equivalent to the reduction in spending in the normative model (23 vs. 24.8 
for the Hi-Lo preferred games and 25.1 vs. 25.1 for the EDLP preferred games). However, in 
moving on to the future price disclosure conditions, subjects’ actual reduction in spending was 
lower than the optimal reduction (6.4 vs. 11.1 and 4.6 vs. 8.7 for the Hi-Lo and EDLP preferred 
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games respectively). One-tail t-tests showed that these differences were statistically significant at 
the 90% and 95% confidence levels respectively (p < 0.10 and p<0.05 respectively). Therefore, 
in support of our hypothesis, subjects performed relatively less well than the normative model as 
price disclosure increased from information on current prices only to information on both 
current and future prices.  
Next, we investigated the role of reduced forward-looking behavior in explaining 
subjects’ deviation from the normative model. To do so, we estimated the model in section 3 for 
each of the three price disclosure conditions, pooling the data across the two price patterns 
(n=59, 70 and 58 respectively). Table 2 reports the results of the estimation2. In interpreting the 
results we first note that, according to normative theory, subjects should be completely forward-
looking (i.e., no discounting should occur). This is the case because subjects in our experiment 
were rewarded on the basis of their total performance at the end of the game. Thus, we controlled 
for normative discounting in our experimental set-up. Therefore, a significant estimate of the 
discounting parameter in the model demonstrates choice behavior by the subject that is less 
forward-looking than the normative model would prescribe (i.e., stronger than normative 
discounting). Subjects should also have no systematic preferences for one store price format over 
the other because all differences between stores are accounted for by price only (i.e., products in 
both stores are identical in the experiment).  
We find that subjects are less forward-looking than the normative model for the current 
price disclosure (δ=.937, p<.05) and future price disclosure (δ=.436, p<.05) conditions, but not 
for the no price disclosure condition (δ=.086, p>.10). We also find that subjects have a 
                                                 
2 We also estimated a latent class version of our model allowing for heterogeneity in discount rates. Although this 
analysis showed that 2-3 segments existed, the results did not lead to differences in interpretation. We only report 
the more parsimonious aggregate results here. The detailed results are reported in the technical appendix to the 
paper.  
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preference for the Hi-Lo price format over the EDLP price format in all three conditions 
(β = .184, p <.05; .469, p<.05; and 0.343, p<.10 in games1, 2 and 3, respectively).  We next turn 
to the estimate of the scale parameter in the model. Recall that the size of this parameter is 
inversely related to the standard deviation of the error component. Thus, our findings indicate 
that the error variance is smallest in the current price disclosure condition (λ= -1.527, p<.05) 
suggesting that subjects’ decision making is most consistent in this condition.  
5. Discussion 
In contrast to past research, which has developed normative models of the role of price 
information in dynamic choice (e.g., Erdem and Keane, 1996; Krishna 1994a,b) or has 
emphasized behavioral deviations from normative models (e.g., Meyer and Assunçao, 1990), we 
investigate how consumers’ deviations from normative models of dynamic decision-making vary 
with different levels of price disclosure. A second, related contribution of this paper is that it 
sheds light on the reasons why, in dynamic tasks, price disclosure improves consumers’ absolute 
performance, but not relative performance (compared to a normative model).  
We now discuss this second contribution in detail. Given that we find that discounting is 
significant in the current disclosure condition, but that relative decision performance is no worse 
in this condition than in the no price disclosure condition, we conclude that reduced forward-
looking can only partially explain a shift in subjects’ decision performance relative to the 
normative model. Similarly, the fact that consumers’ preference for store price format was 
significant in all three price disclosure conditions explains why subjects don’t perform as well as 
the normative model in general, but not why they perform progressively worse than the 
normative model when going from the current to future price disclosure condition.  The 
combined effects of reduced forward-looking and the observed shifts in choice consistency 
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perhaps offer the most likely explanation for our findings. We observe that the high choice 
consistency in the current price disclosure condition compensates for the increased impact of 
reduced forward-looking in this condition. 
To explore possible heuristics that consumers may have used, we studied the choice 
patterns of the different subjects that performed well in each game. This was done by analyzing 
the choices that these subjects made in detail and by constructing rules of thumb that matched 
these subjects’ observed choices. Three main rules of thumb appeared to be effective in the 
different games. A first rule “When nothing in stock go to EDLP and stock up” effectively 
protected respondents from having to buy expensive products in the Hi-Lo store. When 
combined with a second rule “When all products are in stock go to Hi-Lo”, the first rule allowed 
consumers to go to the Hi-Lo store and benefit from discounted products without having to 
purchase expensive products. A third rule “When in Hi-Lo stock up on discounted products” 
further reinforced this positive effect of benefiting from discounts. Computer simulations of the 
effect of applying these rules in the different conditions revealed that they allowed for 
performances that were quite close to optimal. It is interesting to see that only few subjects 
achieved this level of performance and we conclude that only few individuals were using the 
most effective heuristics. This implies that subjects must have used other heuristics as well. 
Our results have implications for consumers, online intermediaries and retailers. First, our 
finding that price disclosure causes consumers’ choices to deviate more sharply from a 
normative model opens up the opportunity, in information-rich retailing environments, of 
offering them decision support to improve the quality of their decisions (and hence their 
welfare). The Internet seems a particularly appropriate medium through which to provide such 
support. Indeed, some online intermediaries currently offer services that are consistent with this 
 18
idea. For example, valupage.com allows consumers to download retail coupons for up to a week 
in advance, while mybudgetplanner.com helps consumers to better plan their purchases over 
time. Even those online and traditional retailers that use direct personalized e-mails to pre-
announce specials to valued loyal customers also—perhaps unintentionally—assist target 
consumers with their dynamic shopping decisions. 
Second, our results show that, ceteris paribus, in the no and current price disclosure 
conditions of our experiment, consumers preferred Hi-Lo over EDLP in terms of store price 
format. It should be noted, however, that in (online) retailing environments in which information 
levels on current prices are relatively high, this information encourages consumers to shop at Hi-
Lo stores only when items are on discount. Therefore, retailers who employ a Hi-Lo strategy 
may be hurt considerably more when current prices are placed online than retailers employing an 
EDLP strategy are. 
This research has some limitations that offer up opportunities for future research. We 
focused on cost minimization in dynamic shopping decisions given fixed consumption rates. 
Although costs are an important factor in consumer decision-making, product preferences and 
actual consumption rates are also clearly important. Our model and experiment also ignore the 
effect of holding costs on stocking behavior, and these costs may be an important influence on 
purchase quantity decisions as well (Assunçao and Meyer, 1993). If holding costs are introduced 
in the model, the normative model structure would be largely the same, with an additive penalty 
for stocking up for future periods. However, the presence of holding costs would further 
complicate the subjects’ optimization task which may cause consumers to benefit less from price 
disclosure, even in the current price disclosure conditions.  
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Although our model allows for heteroscedasticity between price information conditions, 
we did not include possible differences in error structure in the decisions within and across 
periods. By doing so, future research would enable a deeper exploration of variations in 
consumer choice consistency between decisions. More generally, it would be worthwhile in 
future to explore the modeling of subjects’ use of heuristics in a more direct fashion, for 
example, by estimating the likelihood of use of different predefined heuristics. Another relevant 
topic for future research is to disentangle subjects’ non-normative price expectations from their 
non-normative purchase decisions. In our model these two effects were not separated. 
Finally, while we took steps to maximize the external validity and realism of our 
experiment by developing an Internet-based shopping game, by using real-world consumers, and 
by rewarding them to ensure appropriate levels of motivation, it would be interesting to extend 
this study to an entirely real-world retail setting, for instance by conducting an in-store field 
experiment.  
In sum, despite the limitations of this paper, we believe it takes an important first step in 
setting the direction for future research on the influence of price disclosure on consumers’ 
dynamic shopping decisions. 
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 Table 1 Actual and normative consumer spending 
 
    
 Actual average 
spending§ 
Difference in 
spending 
Normative model 
spending 
 
Game 1a 
No price disclosure  
Hi-Lo preferred 
 
266.6 
(10.5) 
 
8.8* 
 
257.8 
Effect of price disclosure 23* -1.8 24.8 
Game 2a 
Current price disclosure  
Hi-Lo preferred 
243.6 
(15.3) 
10.6* 233.0 
Effect of price disclosure 6.4* -4.7** 11.1 
Game 3a 
Future price disclosure 
Hi-Lo preferred 
237.2 
(11.8) 
15.3* 221.9 
Game 1b 
No price disclosure 
EDLP preferred 
266.1 
(8.1) 
10.2* 255.9 
 Effect of price disclosure 25.1* 0.0 25.1 
Game 2b 
Current price disclosure 
EDLP preferred 
241.0 
(7.6) 
10.2* 230.8 
Effect of price disclosure 4.6* -4.1* 8.7 
Game 3b 
Future price disclosure 
EDLP preferred 
236.4 
(6.4) 
14.3* 222.1 
 
§ Standard deviation of actual spending is in parentheses. 
* Significant at 95% confidence level 
** Significant at 90% confidence level 
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Table 2 Dynamic choice model estimates* 
 
 
Scenario 
 
Variable 
 
Parameter 
estimate 
 
t-value 
 
No price disclosure 
(games 1a and 1b):  
 
Store price format 
preference 
(Hi-Lo) (β) 
 
0.184* 
 
14.422 
 Reduced forward-
looking (δ) 
0.086 1.548 
 Scale parameter 
(λ) 
-0.670* -12.676 
Current price 
disclosure 
(games 2a and 2b) 
Store price format 
preference 
(Hi-Lo) (β) 
0.469* 2.465 
 Reduced forward-
looking (δ) 
0.937* 21.970 
 Scale parameter 
(λ) 
-1.527* -25.319 
Future price disclosure 
(games 3a and 3b) 
Store price format 
preference 
(Hi-Lo) (β) 
0.343** 1.701 
 Reduced forward-
looking (δ) 
0.436* 13.154 
 Scale parameter 
(λ) 
-0.995* -30.174 
 
* Significant at 95% confidence level 
** Significant at 90% confidence level 
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Appendix 1. Model Assumptions and Experimental Context 
Our model is closely connected to our Internet-based experiment in which we control for 
several decision variables that consumers may also integrate in their real-world purchase 
decisions. Thus, because of our focus on investigating the role of price information disclosure on 
consumers’ shopping decisions, our model is also in some ways more restrictive than existing 
models of dynamic decisions making.   
First, we imposed the condition that consumers purchase their groceries at regular 
intervals.  Although a simplification of reality, this feature is consistent with behavior observed 
for most grocery purchases which are made in weekly or bi-weekly intervals. For example, Kahn 
and Schmittlein (1989) observed that products such as toilet paper, baked beans and crackers are 
all bought on regular weekly shopping trips.  
Second, we did not investigate consumption goals but took them as given in the 
consumer cost minimization task. Taking consumption goals as known is reasonable in many 
product categories, especially for frequently purchased grocery goods in which consumption 
rates are stable, but may not be realistic for all products (e.g., Bell, Chiang & Padmanabhan 
1999). We also fixed consumption rates in the experiment. However, our model of shopping 
decisions would allow for flexible consumption as long as consumption goals were known to the 
consumer at the time of purchase.  
Third, in our experiment we allowed consumers to change stores from trip to trip, but 
visit only one store per trip. As we explained to subjects, this situation is comparable to one 
where the fixed costs of going to a store (or the costs of ordering and delivery in the Internet 
context) are high enough that visiting (or ordering from) multiple stores is always more costly 
than the potential reduction in price from buying in multiple stores.  
Fourth, because of our focus on shopping choice, we were not interested in brand or 
product choice. Therefore, we indicated to subjects that all available grocery stores carried 
perfect substitutes for all products. Stores differed only in their pricing of these substitutes and in 
the degree to which future prices are communicated.  
Fifth, we imposed some stocking restrictions. Products could only be stocked for a 
maximum storage period, resembling the effect of spoilage. In contrast to several previous 
models (e.g., Krishna 1994a) we did not impose flexible stocking costs. The reason we imposed 
a stocking restriction in this way is to mimic the budget optimization task most consumers face. 
Typically consumers do not face regular out-of-pocket expenses for stocking consumer products. 
Rather consumers are restricted by (rare) discrete decisions they make about their stocking 
capacity at home (e.g., to buy an additional refrigerator or not).  
Sixth, we set up the model and experiment in such a way that a normative model does not 
require discounting of future prices. The reason we chose this level is because we expect it to be 
the level that is simplest for consumers to process and leaves the least room for perceptual error 
on the part of subjects. As a consequence, setting the normative discount level to zero allows for 
a more straightforward test of variations in the degree of forward-looking in consumer decision-
making: If variations in discounting are observed in our analysis, it represents a clear rejection of 
the normative model.  
Finally, we informed subjects that prices in the stores took on a discrete probability 
distribution with no memory over periods. Doing so allowed for a more direct test of consumer 
shopping decision-making, because no consumer learning or forward looking was required in 
predicting the probability of discounts. 
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Technical Appendix 
 
Solution of the consumer dynamic programming problem 
 
This appendix provides the solution to the consumer’s dynamic programming problem 
for periods T and T-1 starting from the last period. Solutions for other periods are reached using 
backward induction, repeating the steps described in this appendix.  
Let Qntw be the quantity of product n bought in week w that remains at the end of week t 
(net of quantity that was consumed and that spoiled) and Cntw be the quantity of product n bought 
in week w and consumed in week t. Let An be the maximum number of weeks that product n can 
be stored after purchase.  Then, we express Qntw as follows (see equation 1 to 3 for definitions of 
the other variables):  
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Further, the total amount of product n in stock at the end of week t is defined as: 
∑
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The consumer’s dynamic optimization problem can be solved by backward induction. We start 
with the last period T and calculate the minimal total expected cost (spending + store preference) 
at time T as a function of Qn(T-1), the total quantity of product n remaining in stock at the end of 
week T-1. The consumer chooses the store to visit sT and the quantity to buy qntα. 
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Next, we can calculate the minimal expected cost at T-1 as a function Qn(T-2). QnT-1 can be 
calculated based on QnT-2, sT-1 and qn(T-1)α. 
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This process of backward induction is repeated until the period in which the current consumer 
decision takes place. Thus, it can provide a solution for any given period. 
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Segmentation analysis 
 
To allow for possible heterogeneity in subject behavior we estimated a conditional 
random coefficients version of the models for the forward-looking parameters. In these models a 
discrete heterogeneity distribution was used to approximate the underlying distribution of the 
forward-looking parameters. Maximum likelihood was used in the estimation which involved 
both the estimation of the equivalent of the parameters in the aggregate model for each segment 
and the estimation of the probability masses of the distribution of the parameter values. Jain, 
Vilcassim and Chintagunta (1994) provide details on the likelihood function for the static case, 
which is comparable to the optimization in each period in our model. The optimal number of 
segments for each parameter and each price level information condition was determined based 
on the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). 
The results of the heterogeneity analysis are presented in Table S1 and showed that there 
were two segments for the no price disclosure condition and three segments for the current and 
future price disclosure conditions. The probability masses for the three segments in the latter two 
conditions were more or less equal (around 0.33 probability) and the parameter estimates fairly 
symmetric around the middle value. This result indicated that there were no clear discrete 
differences between respondents (e.g., due to differences in choice strategy), but that respondents 
differed on a more or less continuous scale in terms of the degree to which they were forward-
looking. In the no price disclosure condition, however, segments were more different in size, 
with one distinct segment performing close to optimal. 
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Table S1 Forward-looking based segmentation ** 
 
 
Scenario 
 
2 segment 
estimates 
 
Relative 
segment 
size 
 
3 segment 
estimates 
 
Relative
segment 
size 
 
4 segment 
estimates 
 
Relative 
segment 
size 
 
No price disclosure 
(games 1a and 1b) 
0.065 
0.113 
0.173 
0.827 
0.065 
0.112 
0.113 
0.175 
0.412 
0.413 
-  
Loglikelihood 
improvement  
87.32*  4.37    
       
Current price 
disclosure 
(games 2a and 2b) 
0.580 
1.279 
0.462 
0.538 
0.450 
0.961 
1.432 
0.336 
0.303 
0.361 
0.350 
0.848 
1.016 
1.523 
0.268 
0.220 
0.234 
0.278 
Loglikelihood 
improvement  
69.73*  15.84*  4.11  
       
Future price 
disclosure 
(games 3a and 3b) 
0.234 
0.642 
0.489 
0.511 
0.171 
0.446 
0.711 
0.311 
0.357 
0.332 
0.118 
0.410 
0.524 
0.742 
0.250 
0.242 
0.260 
0.248 
Loglikelihood 
improvement  
21.09*  12.74*  2.22  
       
 
* Significant at 95% confidence level for using one additional degree of freedom (based on BIC 
criterion) 
** Segmentation conditional on estimates for average store preference and price parameters per 
condition (Table 1) 
 
 
